Book Review: Law and Peace in International Relations by Borchard, Edwin
BOOK REVIEWS
self be valid it should not be hamstrung by the invalidation of
these powers because they are to be exercised beyond the period
of the Rule against Perpetuities. The failure to distinguish be-
tween the two kinds of powers would seem to have arisen from
the tendency already deprecated of making the law of perpe-
tuities a mechanical thing turning exclusively on remoteness of
vesting. 3
The fourth edition is worthy of its predecessors.
PERCY BORDWELL*
LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Hans Kel-
sen.t Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1942. Pp.
xi., 181. $2.00.
In these six lectures, delivered at Cambridge in March 1941,
the distinguished Viennese scholar, Dr. Kelsen, now at Harvard,
presents his views, some previously announced, on (1) the con-
cept of law, (2) the nature of international law, (3) interna-
tional law and the State, (4) the technique of international law,
(5) federal State or confederacy of States, and (6) "interna-
tional administration" or "international court." The first four
deal with ahialytical jurisprudence, disconnected from any so-
cial content; the last two present the author's views on the na-
ture of the new organization, federation or confederation of
States, which seems likely to evolve from the present conflict as
a means of assuring a more intelligent international life, and
concludes that the postwar effort of states should concentrate on
the creation of an international court with compulsory jurisdic-
tion of "all" disputes. This he thinks reflects a workable anal-
ogy to the growth of law within the primitive State, courts pre-
ceding legislation, and affords a basis for the hope that interna-
tional development will follow the same course.
Since it cannot be assumed that Dr. Kelsen is unaware of
the economic and political source of international conflict and
their potency in qualifying the claims of law as a social control,
it must be assumed that the author's treatment of the legal con-
cepts is a deliberate choice of one aspect of the subject only, and
in the reviewer's opinion, by no means the most significant. In-
ternational law in a revolutionary period weakens before the
23 See page 157 supra.
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immediate prevalence of force, and among so dynamic a group
of power entities; never had more than a limited claim to social
control. The attempt of some erroneously labeled "peace" ad-
vocates to endow it with the coercive instrumentalities of mu-
nicipal law has been a peace-destroying agency, for coercion,
centralized or decentralized, is not congenial to peace among
theoretical equals. By seeking to "enforce peace" among power
entities that device, elaborated in the Covenant of the League of
Nations, has invoked war to promote "peace," postponing the
end to the Greek Calends but insuring the perpetuity of the
means.
The first four lectures of this book are admittedly con-
ceptual in character. While the author realizes that interna-
tional law cannot be law in the same sense as municipal law, he
is nevertheless tempted to seek in international law the element
of coercion which he regards as the essence of municipal law,
and the characteristic which distinguishes law from other forms
of social control, like ethics and morals. The State's power in-
ternally to establish the norms of behavior, to establish by
courts the existence of departures from the norm, called delicts,
and the State's power through societal agents to penalize or ap-
ply sanctions like damages, are the indicia of a mature legal
system. Since some of these elements are necessarily lacking
from a system which purports to govern, within certain limits,
a group of independent, so-called sovereign States, the learned
author might have clarified the subject by pointing out the fun-
damental differences between international law and municipal
law, instead of exploiting doubtful analogies. He is correct in
saying that any "community" is possible only if there is mutual
respect for the members' rights, and might have added that this
necessary element of cohesion is now sadly lacking in interna-
tional relations, thus making exceedingly difficult the uphill task
of restoring confidence. This, the author admits (p. 167), is
an indispensable condition of obtaining the consent of States for
the compulsory jurisdiction of an international court, and, he
might have added, for the existence of workable relations, legal,
economic, or political, among States.
In dealing with'the nature of international law Dr. Kelsen
recognizes that the limits of the attainable in international or-
ganization is -a-confederation or union.with limited centraliza-
tion which shall not impair statehood too greatly. While prob-
ably true, the author would doubtless admit that this proposal
is purely formal only, and that whether this is a "solution of the
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peace problem" (p. 28) depends upon hundreds of other sub-
stantive social facts, like tempering the unfair competition
which distinguishes the life of States. Dr. Kelsen, in building a
supposed analogy between municipal and international law, is
much concerned with the establishment of international delict
and sanction, the former not privileged under the system, the
latter a penalty and privileged. He concludes that reprisals
and war may be either delicts or sanctions, the latter depending
upon whether the reprisal or war is "rightful." Stumped by the
necessity of establishing a criterion of rightfulness and a quali-
fied judge of the question, he is led to espousing the ancient
criterion of the "just war," for which he confesses a predilection
as a factor in considering international law as "true" law. But
he fails to make clear that the "just war" has always been a
theoretical conception only and has proved unworkable (even in
the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact), because every
State asserts righteousness in its cause and there is or can be no
impartial or accepted judge. And if war is deemed "morally"
wrong, how account for the recent announcement of an eminent
statesman that it is "absurd and suicidal" for neutrals to stay
out of the present war?
The "bellum justum," the author is constrained to admit, is
actually arn intellectual issue, arising only. during a period of
great wars. As an honest scholar, Dr. Kelsen is forced to con-
cede the impracticability of a workable distinction between licit
and illicit wars (p. 47) and might have added the corollary that
th6 concept of "aggressors" is equally useless.
The eradication of international conflict, like the cause, lies
infinitely deeper than any legal apparatus could supply. For
that reason, objections to the bellum justum conception are not,
as the author states (p. 48), objections to the legal character of
international law, but objections founded on practical grounds,
which have nothing to do with legal criteria. Dr. Kelsen con-
cedes that international law is a primitive system, but sometimes
does not draw the necessary conclusions from that admission.
At one point (p. 33) he admits that there is a school of thought
-to which the reviewer confesses allegiance-which regards
war as neither a delict nor a sanction, in other words, as a dis-
ease which afflicts mankind, and that it is better, while taking
every measure to cure the disease and remove its causes, to
regulate it than to leave it unregulated. That function of in-
ternational law should have had more of the author's attention,
since the human race seems pretty recalcitrant and cannot be
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greatly changed by scholars. Self-help is not the greatest of
evils, although it evidences a primitive system. I should doubt
whether the author would insist upon his statement that if we
do not regard war as in principle forbidden, then international
law cannot be considered a legal order. Quite the contrary; it
is merely a narrowly limited legal order, a qualification which
militates against such grandiose solutions as provided by articles
12-17 of the Covenant of the League, which Dr. Kelsen correctly
criticizes, and which also militates against the likelihood of any
early adoption of Kelsen's suggestion of a compulsory jurisdic-
tion of an international court for "all" disputes. Even if war
were denounced as illegal, that would not help to eradicate it.
By admitting at the very end of the chapter that the bellum
justum is a theory and not a fact (p. 54), Dr. Kelsen, it is pre-
sumed, would hardly wish to subscribe to the view that inter-
national law is also a theory and not a fact. If he says that it
is not "true" law, that is only because he has made his own de-
finition of law in the guise of a mature municipal law, as did
Austin, and necessarily finds divergencies from that system in
international law.
In the third chapter, Dr. Kelsen, having deplored the non-
legal character of international law, comes now to its defense
and goes so far as to say (p. 56), "International law can be re-
garded as true law because it can be regarded as a coercive order
which reserves to the international community the use of force-
establishes a monopoly of the use of force." This sounds
strange, since he had just stated that this is a condition contrary
to fact, as it of course is. There is and can be no centralized
community force, and the illusion of the League of Nations cen-
tralizing the command of force at Geneva was bound to be
punctured. The verbalism is saved by Dr. Kelsen's suggesting
that a State which exerts self-help as a sanction [approved (by
whom?) reprisal or war] is acting as an organ of the interna-
tional legal community. So Corfu was sanctified by the Confer-
ence of Ambassadors in 1923, but that hardly enhanced the pres-
tige of law or the League. But "forceful" interferences by
some nations in the sphere of interests of other nations, as the
author suggests, are by no means the only ones that awaken
interest and stimulate sanctions, community or otherwise. More
injurious are tariffs, quotas, trade and immigration restrictions
of all kinds. These arouse deep resentments, but they are licit
under international law, and a court of compulsory jurisdiction
would under existing law only confirm them; if it were to have
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jurisdiction to change them and thus impair what is deemed a
national prerogative, we would truly be living in a new world
hardly conceivable. Its jurisdiction cannot be self-assumed, but
would have to be granted by the nations, a fact which militates
against optimism as to its powers. Dr. Kelsen criticizes
Austin's view that international law is international morality
because there is no superior-inferior relation as in municipal
law; Kelsen disputes such a position, even in municipal law, and
concludes that the relation of the State (lawJ to the individual
is not materially different from the relation of international
law to States-the relation of a part to the whole.
In the chapter on international law and the State, Dr. Kel-
sen endeavors to show that international law can be called law
in the same sense as national law, which the second chapter, it
seems to the reviewer, had undertaken to deny. Obviously,
labels do not solve this issue, but perhaps 'confuse it. Clear it is,
that international law is created in a different way, is on the
whole applied in a different way, and has sanctions that are dif-
ferent from those of municipal law. It is a different type of
law than municipal, applied by different agents and deals with
a subject matter, national States, entirely different from in-
dividuals. Why time should be taken to assimilate the irrecon-
cilable, even for academic purposes, is hard to see, and if time
were available, it could, I think, be proved that the effort has
done the cause of clear thinking and the cause of peace irretriev-
able injury.
Dr. Kelsen introduces many ingenious devices and conceits
which are of interest to the student of jurisprudence, e.g., the
centralization and decentralization in the creation and applica-
tion of law in the two systems, the control of individuals by in-
ternational law through the agency of national States, etc. His
view on piracy differs'from that of Professor Bingham in the
Research on International Law (p. 92). Dr. Kelsen in the
fourth chapter concedes a difference in technique between the
municipal and the international system. That the sanctions are
directed to States as a whole does not, I think, indicate that the
principle of collective responsibility has any special significance,
since obviously States are composed of numerous individuals; it
is true that many international obligations must be transmuted
into municipal legislation before the individual can be effectively
bound to any societal agents. But only State agents and not
the individual citizen can as a rule bind the nation, the subject
of international law. Dr. Kelsen might have mentioned the
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important topic of civil responsibility of the State in interna-
tional law, one of the most legal of the subjects of international
law, which has been worked out by diplomacy and arbitration to
an established place in the hierarchy of public liability. Since
this is still largely based on fault, it is hard to preceive how the
statement is justified (p. 102) that neither intent nor neg-
ligence, but only absolute liability, forms an essential element of
the international legal delict. Hundreds of cases to the con-
trary have been systematized by international tribunals and
writers. One might therefore be disposed to refute the sug-
gestion (p. 112) that the norms of general international law-
customary law-provide only the possibility of establishing
treaty relations. And this depreciation of the scope of the
norms of international law might weaken the force of the pro-
posal that an international court with compulsory jurisdiction
affords a way out of otr difficulties.
The fifth chapter, on the distinction between a federal State
or confederacy of States, covers ground familiar to the Amer-
ican student of political science. Kelsen deplores the unanimity
rule which a confederacy, the only feasible international organi-
zation, implies. This is one of his reasons for questioning the
propriety or efficacy of international "administration" along
either League or federation lines, and for preferring an inter-
national court, which might deal with important questions by
majority vote. Kelsen points out what should always have been
plain, that the execution of a sanction by a confederacy against
a member State having control of its own army means war.
Too bad that the framers of article 16 of the Covenant did not
recognize this elementary axiom. Yet while demonstrating the
impracticability of any league of States defending members
against nonmembers (p. 155) or trying to compel member States
to take part in a joint war in which they have no interest, Dr.
Kelsen seems to think that members can be made to assume
military duties against other members of the group "even if the
only purpose is to maintain peace among the members." This
seems to the reviewer highly doubtful, as it did to Hamilton and
Madison in its application to knit so closely a federation as the
United States. It is believed that no organization of so-called
independent States can be devised on any wide scale "within
which peace is assured" (p. 137). That is because no organi-
zation yet proposed has been assumed to have power to go to the
heart of the problem, but has dealt with formalism and symp-
toms only.
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Kelsen, with some justification, would leave States relative-
ly unchanged, but lightly posits the idea that such States will
agree to an international compulsory jurisdiction of "all" dis-
putes. He insists on the democratic requirement of self-deter-
mination of States, whereas several students have demonstrated
that this is profoundly inconsistent with sensible economic rela-
tions and ultimately with peace itself, even if there were agree-
ment on what shall be the scope of the unit of self-determina-
tion.' Kelsen is skeptical of any union among transcontinental
States and would approach the problem of international organi-
zation by gradual advances, omit community sanctions, and con-
fine the next step to the establishment of an international court
with compulsory jurisdiction. Aside from the objections to
such jurisdiction which the author cites-and seeks to refute-
there are many which he has overlooked, notably, the fact that
such an organization needs a trustful atmosphere not likely soon
to be restored, that nations have never been willing to grant a
compulsory jurisdiction except within narrow legal limits, that
the problems which cause conflict are rarely legal but economic
and political in character, hardly of a type which a court could
practically deal with and which nations are hardly today likely
to entrust to an international court. Indeed, most conflicts do
not arise out of particular disputes at all, but out of deep-seated
resentments and hostile attitudes. Even if the court were ex-
panded to include the power of conciliation, much ground must
first be covered to remove the substantive barriers to interna-
tional concord. Moreover, before progress can be made, all
idea of "enforcing peace" by sanctions on the disfavored must be
scotched, since that only militates against any chance of a will-
ingness to cooperate in submitting economic or political prob-
lems to an international forum or to surrender any of the pre-
rogatives of national sovereignty. While Dr. Kelsen fails to
grapple with the fundamental factors making international rela-
tions what they are, he nevertheless covers a considerable sphere
of State activity and with his customary learning and power of
analysis has given us a provocative book.
EDWIN BORHAND*
See CARR, CONDTONS OF PEACE (1942) c. 3; BUTLER, THE LOST PEACE(1942).
* Professor of Law, Yale University.
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